Double jeopardy

Double jeopardy is a that prevents an accused person from being  again on the same (or similar) charges and on the same facts, following a valid acquittal or conviction. As described by the U.S. Supreme Court in its unanimous decision concerning  163 U.S. 662 (1896), one of its earliest cases dealing with double jeopardy, "the prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused, whether convicted or acquitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial."

If this issue is raised, evidence will be placed before the court, which will normally rule as a preliminary matter whether the plea is substantiated; if it is, the projected trial will be prevented from proceeding. In some countries, including Canada, Mexico and the United States, the guarantee against being "twice put in jeopardy" is a constitutional right. In other countries, the protection is afforded by.

In countries, a defendant may enter a  of autrefois acquit (formerly acquitted) or autrefois convict (formerly convicted), with the same effect.

The doctrine appears to have originated in Roman law, in the principle  ("an issue once decided must not be raised again").

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The 72 and 166 parties to the  recognise, under Article 14 (7): "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally  or  in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country."

European Convention on Human Rights
All members of the (which includes nearly all European countries and every member of the ) have adopted the. The optional Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, Article 4, protects against double jeopardy: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an for which he or she has already been finally  or  in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State."

This optional protocol has been ratified by all EU states except three:, the , and the. In those member states, national rules governing double jeopardy may or may not comply with the provision cited above.

Member states may, however, implement legislation which allows reopening of a case in the event that new evidence is found or if there was a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings:

"The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case."

In many European countries, the prosecution may appeal an acquittal to a higher court. This is not regarded as double jeopardy, but as a continuation of the same case. The European Convention on Human Rights permits this by using the phrase "finally acquitted or convicted" (emphasis added) as the trigger for prohibiting subsequent prosecution.

Australia
In contrast to other common law nations, Australian double jeopardy law has been held to further prevent the prosecution for following a previous acquittal where a finding of perjury would controvert the acquittal. This was confirmed in the case of , where the police found new evidence convincingly disproving Carroll's sworn two decades after he had been acquitted of murder charges in the death of  child Deidre Kennedy, and successfully prosecuted him for perjury. Public outcry following the overturn of his conviction (for perjury) by the has led to widespread calls for reform of the law along the lines of the England and Wales legislation.

During a meeting of 2007, model legislation to rework double jeopardy laws was drafted, but there was no formal agreement for each state to introduce it. All states have now chosen to introduce legislation that mirrors COAG's recommendations on "fresh and compelling" evidence.

In, retrials of serious cases with a minimum sentence of 20 years or more are now possible, whether or not the original trial preceded the 2006 reform. On 17 October 2006, the passed legislation abolishing the rule against double jeopardy in cases where:
 * an acquittal of a "life sentence offence" (, violent, large commercial supply or production of ) is debunked by "fresh and compelling" evidence of guilt;
 * an acquittal of a "15 years or more sentence offence" was tainted (by perjury,, or perversion of the course of justice).

On 30 July 2008, also introduced legislation to scrap parts of its double jeopardy law, legalising retrials for serious offences with "fresh and compelling" evidence, or if the acquittal was tainted.

In, on 8 September 2011 amendments were introduced that would allow also retrial if "new and compelling" evidence was found. It would apply to serious offences where the penalty was life imprisonment or imprisonment for 14 years or more. Acquittal because of tainting (,, or perjury) would also allow retrial.

In, on 19 August 2008, amendments were introduced to allow retrial in serious cases, if there is "fresh and compelling" evidence.

In on 21 December 2011, legislation was passed allowing new trials where there is "fresh and compelling DNA evidence, where the person acquitted subsequently admits to the crime, or where it becomes clear that key witnesses have given false evidence". Retrial applications however could only be made for serious offences such as murder, manslaughter, arson causing death, serious drug offences and aggravated forms of rape and armed robbery.

In on 18 October 2007, the double jeopardy laws were modified to allow a retrial where fresh and compelling evidence becomes available after an acquittal for murder or a "tainted acquittal" for a crime carrying a 25-year or more sentence. A "tainted acquittal" requires a conviction for an administration of justice offence, such as perjury, that led to the original acquittal. Unlike reforms in the United Kingdom, New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, this law does not have a retrospective effect, which is unpopular with some advocates of the reform.

Canada
The includes provisions such as  prohibiting double jeopardy. However, this prohibition applies only after an accused person has been "finally" convicted or acquitted. allows the prosecution to appeal an acquittal: if the acquittal is thrown out, the new trial is not considered to be double jeopardy, as the verdict of the first trial would have been annulled. In rare circumstances, a might also substitute a conviction for an acquittal. This is not considered to be double jeopardy, either – in this case, the appeal and subsequent conviction are deemed to be a continuation of the original trial.

For an appeal from an acquittal to be successful, the requires that the  show that an error in law was made during the trial and that the error contributed to the verdict. It has been suggested that this test is unfairly beneficial to the prosecution. For instance, lawyer, in his book My Life in Crime and Other Academic Adventures, contends that the rule should be changed so that a retrial is granted only when the error is shown to be responsible for the verdict, not just a factor.

A notable example of this is, who was wrongfully convicted in his second trial after the acquittal in his first trial was vacated by the Supreme Court of Canada.

In the case, for instance, the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned Turcotte's  verdict and ordered a second trial after it found that the judge committed an error in the first trial while giving instructions to the jury. Turcotte was later convicted of second-degree murder in the second trial.

France
Once all appeals have been exhausted on a case, the judgement is final and the action of the prosecution is closed (code of penal procedure, art. 6), except if the final ruling was. Prosecution for a crime already judged is impossible even if incriminating evidence has been found. However, a person who has been convicted may request another trial on grounds of new evidence through a procedure known as révision.

Germany
The (Grundgesetz) for the Federal Republic of Germany does provide protection against double jeopardy if a final verdict is pronounced. A verdict is final if nobody appeals against it.

However, each trial party can appeal against a verdict in the first instance. This means the prosecution and/or the defendants can appeal against a judgement if they do not agree with it. In this case the trial starts again in the second instance, the court of appeal (Berufungsgericht), which considers the facts and reasons again and delivers the final judgement then.

If one of the parties disagrees with the judgement of the second instance, he or she can appeal it, but only on formal judicial reasons. The case will checked in the third instance (Revisionsgericht), whether all laws are applied correctly.

The rule applies to the whole "historical event, which is usually considered a single historical course of actions the separation of which would seem unnatural". This is true even if new facts occur that indicate other and/or much serious crimes.

The Penal Procedural Code (Strafprozessordnung) permits a retrial (Wiederaufnahmeverfahren), if it is in favor of the defendant or if following events had happened:

In the case of an order of, which can be issued by the court without a trial for lesser misdemeanours, there is a further exception:

In Germany, a felony is defined by § 12 (1) StGB as a crime which has a minimum of one year of imprisonment.

India
A partial protection against double jeopardy is a guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the, which states "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once". This provision enshrines the concept of autrefois convict, that no one convicted of an offence can be tried or punished a second time. However, it does not extend to autrefois acquit, and so if a person is acquitted of a crime he can be retried. In India, protection against autrefois acquit is a, not a fundamental one. Such protection is provided by provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure rather than by the Constitution.

Japan
The states in Article 39 that
 * No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy.

In practice, however, if someone is acquitted in a lower District Court, then the prosecutor can appeal to the High Court, and then to the Supreme Court. Only the acquittal in the Supreme Court is the final acquittal which prevents any further retrial. This process sometimes takes decades.

The above is not considered a violation of the constitution. Because of Supreme Court precedent, this process is all considered part of a single proceeding.

The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the state prosecution can appeal a not-guilty verdict at the bench. New evidence can be brought to bear during a retrial at a district court. Thus one can be tried twice for the same alleged crime. If one is convicted at the district court, the defence can make an appeal on procedural grounds to the supreme court. The supreme court might admit this complaint, and the case will be reopened yet again, at another district court. Again, new evidence might be introduced by the prosecution.

On 9 April 2013 the Dutch senate voted 36 "yes" versus 35 "no" in favor of a new law that allows the prosecutor to re-try a person who was found not guilty in court. This new law is limited to crimes where someone died and new evidence must have been gathered. The new law also works retroactively.

Pakistan
Article 13 of the protects a person from being punished or prosecuted more than once for the same offence.

Serbia
This principle is incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and further elaborated in its Criminal Procedure Act.

South Africa
The in the  forbids a retrial when there has already been an acquittal or a conviction.

South Korea
Article 13 of the South Korean constitution provides that no citizen shall be placed in double jeopardy.

England and Wales
Double jeopardy has been permitted in in certain (exceptional) circumstances since the.

Pre-2003
The doctrines of  and autrefois convict persisted as part of the from the time of the ; they were regarded as essential elements for protection of the subject's liberty and respect for  of law in that there should be finality of proceedings. There were only three exceptions, all relatively recent, to the rules:
 * The prosecution has a right of appeal against acquittal in summary cases if the decision appears to be wrong in law or in excess of jurisdiction.
 * A retrial is permissible if the interests of justice so require, following appeal against conviction by a defendant.
 * A "tainted acquittal", where there has been an offence of interference with, or intimidation of, a juror or witness, can be challenged in the High Court.

In  [1964] AC 1254, the ruled that a defendant could not be tried for any offence arising out of substantially the same set of facts relied upon in a previous charge of which he had been acquitted, unless there are "special circumstances" proven by the prosecution. There is little case law on the meaning of "special circumstances", but it has been suggested that the emergence of new evidence would suffice.

A defendant who had been convicted of an offence could be given a second trial for an aggravated form of that offence if the facts constituting the aggravation were discovered after the first conviction. By contrast, a person who had been acquitted of a lesser offence could not be tried for an aggravated form even if new evidence became available.

Post-2003
Following the, the Macpherson Report recommended that the double jeopardy rule should be in murder cases, and that it should be possible to subject an acquitted murder suspect to a second trial if "fresh and viable" new evidence later came to light. The later added its support to this in its report "Double Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals" (2001). A parallel report into the by, a past  for England and Wales, had also commenced in 1999 and was published as the Auld Report six months after the Law Commission report. It opined that the Law Commission had been unduly cautious by limiting the scope to murder and that "the exceptions should [...] extend to other grave offences punishable with life and/or long terms of imprisonment as Parliament might specify."

Both (then ) and  (then ) favoured this measure. These recommendations were implemented—not uncontroversially at the time—within the, and this provision came into force in April 2005. It opened certain serious crimes (including murder,, , rape, , and serious drug crimes) to a retrial, regardless of when committed, with two conditions: the must be approved by the , and the  must agree to quash the original acquittal due to "new and compelling evidence". Pressure by Ann Ming, the mother of 1989 murder victim Julie Hogg—whose killer, William Dunlop, was initially acquitted in 1991 and subsequently confessed—also contributed to the demand for legal change.

On 11 September 2006, Dunlop became the first person to be convicted of murder following a prior acquittal for the same crime, in his case his 1991 acquittal of Julie Hogg's murder. Some years later he had confessed to the crime, and was convicted of perjury, but was unable to be retried for the killing itself. The case was re-investigated in early 2005, when the new law came into effect, and his case was referred to the Court of Appeal in November 2005 for permission for a new trial, which was granted. Dunlop pleaded guilty to murdering Julie Hogg and was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a recommendation he serve no less than 17 years.

On 13 December 2010, Mark Weston became the first person to be retried and found guilty of murder by a jury (Dunlop having confessed). In 1996 Weston had been acquitted of the murder of Vikki Thompson at on 12 August 1995, but following the discovery in 2009 of compelling new evidence (Thompson's blood on Weston's boots) he was arrested and tried for a second time. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, to serve a minimum of 13 years.

Scotland
The double jeopardy rule no longer applies absolutely in since the  came into force on 28 November 2011. The Act introduced three broad exceptions to the rule: where the acquittal had been tainted by an attempt to pervert the course of justice; where the accused admitted his guilt after acquittal; and where there was new evidence.

Northern Ireland
In the, effective 18 April 2005, makes certain "qualifying offence" (including murder, rape, kidnapping, specified sexual acts with young children, specified drug offences, defined acts of terrorism, as well as in certain cases attempts or conspiracies to commit the foregoing) subject to retrial after acquittal (including acquittals obtained before passage of the Act) if there is a finding by the Court of Appeal that there is "new and compelling evidence."

United States
The ancient protection of the against double jeopardy is maintained in its full rigor in the United States, beyond reach of any change save that of a Constitutional Amendment. The provides:
 * "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. ... "

Conversely, double jeopardy comes with a key exception. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, multiple sovereigns can indict a defendant for the same crime. The federal and state governments can have overlapping criminal laws, so a criminal offender may be convicted in individual states and federal courts for exactly the same crime or for different crimes arising out of the same facts. However, in 2016, the Supreme Court that  is not a separate sovereign for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The dual sovereignty doctrine has been the subject of substantial scholarly criticism.

The Double Jeopardy Clause encompasses four distinct prohibitions: subsequent prosecution after acquittal, subsequent prosecution after conviction, subsequent prosecution after certain mistrials, and multiple punishment in the same indictment. Jeopardy "attaches" when the jury is empanelled, the first witness is sworn, or a plea is accepted.

Prosecution after acquittal
With two exceptions, the government is not permitted to appeal or retry the defendant once jeopardy attaches to a trial unless the case does not conclude. Conditions which constitute "conclusion" of a case include In these cases the trial is concluded and the prosecution is precluded from appealing or retrying the defendant over the offense to which they were acquitted.
 * After the entry of an acquittal,
 * whether a directed verdict before the case is submitted to the jury,
 * a directed verdict after a deadlocked jury,
 * an appellate reversal for sufficiency (except by direct appeal to a higher appellate court),
 * or an "implied acquittal" via conviction of a.
 * re-litigating against the same defense a fact necessarily found by the jury in a prior acquittal, even if the jury hung on other counts. In such a situation, the government is barred by.

This principle does not prevent the government from appealing a pre-trial motion to dismiss or other non-merits dismissal, or a directed verdict after a jury conviction, nor does it prevent the trial judge from entertaining a motion for reconsideration of a directed verdict, if the jurisdiction has so provided by rule or statute. Nor does it prevent the government from retrying the defendant after an appellate reversal other than for sufficiency, including , or "thirteenth juror" appellate reversals notwithstanding sufficiency on the principle that jeopardy has not "terminated."

The "dual sovereignty" doctrine allows a federal prosecution of an offense to proceed regardless of a previous state prosecution for that same offense and vice versa because "an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each." The doctrine is solidly entrenched in the law, but there has been a traditional reluctance in the federal executive branch to gratuitously wield the power it grants, due to public opinion being generally hostile to such action.

Exceptions
The first exception to a ban on retrying a defendant is if, in a trial, the defendant bribed the judge into acquitting him or her, since the defendant was not in jeopardy.

The other exception to a ban on retrying a defendant is that the perpetrator can be retried by court martial in a military court, if they have been previously acquitted by a civilian court, and are members of the military.

Multiple punishment, including prosecution after conviction
In  (1932), the Supreme Court announced the following test: the government may separately try and punish the defendant for two crimes if each crime contains an element that the other does not. Blockburger is the default rule, unless the governing statute legislatively intends to depart; for example, (CCE) may be punished separately from its predicates, as can conspiracy.

The Blockburger test, originally developed in the multiple punishments context, is also the test for prosecution after conviction. In ' (1990), the Court held that a double jeopardy violation could lie even where the Blockburger test was not satisfied, but Grady was overruled in ' (1993).

Prosecution after mistrial
The rule for s depends upon who sought the mistrial. If the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial, unless the prosecutor acted in "bad faith," i.e. goaded the defendant into moving for a mistrial because the government specifically wanted a mistrial. If the prosecutor moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial if the trial judge finds "manifest necessity" for granting the mistrial. The same standard governs mistrials granted.

Retrials are not common, due to the legal expenses to the government. However, in the mid-1980s Georgia antiques dealer was tried a record four times for the murder of Danny Hansford and (after three mistrials) was finally acquitted on the grounds of self-defense. The case is recounted in the book  which was adapted into a film directed by (the movie omits the first three murder trials).